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CASE COMMENTS
RIGHT TO PICKET ON QUASI-PUBLIC PROPERTY
The commercial use of private property which intentionally results in increased accessibility to the general public transforms the
nature of the property from purely private to quasi-public. Neither
the right to picket, as an exercise of free speech,2 nor a private
property owner's right to prevent trespassory invasions of his property3 is clearly established with respect to labor picketing on quasipublic property.4 When an owner utilizes the trespass theory5 in at-

tempting to enjoin picketing on such property the two rights are
drawn into conflict. 6 Where jurisdiction has not been pre-empted by
"State v. Williams, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357, 2364 (Baltimore, Md. Grim. Ct. 1959).
2
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US. 5Ol (1946) (concurring opinion). The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the constitutional right of free speech,
which is secured against state invasion by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, will render a state powerless to prohibit absolutely all peaceful picketing without regard to purpose and circumstance. Carlson v. California, 31o U.S.
io6 (194o); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US . 88 (1940); Senn v. Tile Layers Union,
301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937).
'See Fairlawn Meats, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427, 99 Ohio
App. 517, 135 N.E.2d 689, appeal dismissed, 164 Ohio St. 285, 13o N.E.2d 237 (1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207,
58 Wash. 2d 426, 363.P.2d 8o3 (1961) (concurring opinion). See also Hood v. Stafford,
213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees
Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876, 879 (1962) (dictum); Exchange Bakery
& Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 13o, reargument denied, 245
N.Y. 651, 157 N.E. 895 (1927).
'Compare the following cases: Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers' Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d. 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1964), cert. denied,
380 US. 906 (1965); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping
Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122u N.W.2d 785 (1963); Freeman v. Retail Clerks
Local 1207, 58 Wash. ad 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store
Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
5
Under common law, an unauthorized entry upon the premises of another
without invitation, either express or implied, which resulted in an interference
with possession, constituted a trespass. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 13 (3 d ed. 1964).
The basis upon which the theory of trespass is applied in attempting to enjoin
picketing is that since pickets have not been invited, either expressly or impliedly,
upon an owner's property, their presence upon such property constitutes an unauthorized entry; and since picketing acts as a deterrent to the public in patronizing commercial establishments, such acts therefore result in an economic interference with the owner's possession. See Nahas v. Local go5, Retail Clerks, 144
Cal. App. 2d 808, 301 P.2d 932, 936 (1956).
6See Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers' Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766,
394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 38o U.S. 906 (1965).
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s
either the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 19327 or state anti-injunction acts,
resolution of this conflict has fallen upon the judiciary.9
Logan Valley Plaza, Incorporatedv. Amalgamated Food Employees
Local 50910 involved union members who picketed in a parcel pick-up
zone and occasionally on a porch in front of Weis' Market, a non-union
store which was located within Logan Valley Mall shopping center.
Union members did not confine their activities to the area immediately
in front of Weis' Market but picketed in the parking lot and at
entrances and exits of the shopping center. The picketing was a result
of an unsuccessful attempt by the union to organize the employees of
Weis. After the picketing had commenced, both Weis and Logan
brought an action to enjoin the union's activity. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in a four-to-three decision, affirmed the lower court's
decision and held that the pickets were trespassing upon the private
property of the store and shopping center owner and that such trespass constituted a reasonable ground upon which to grant a preliminary injunction.
The court, in Logan Valley, recognized that a private property
owner has the right to be protected against unlawful invasion of his
property. In determining the union's right to picket, the court considered three elements upon which the legality of the picketing turned:
the nature of the picketing; the conduct of the pickets; and the purpose of the picketing. Since the court found that the picketing was
peaceful in nature, the legality of the picketing turned upon the
729 U.S.C. §§ 1o1-115 (1964).
$See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-4-16 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-113 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (Smith-Hurd ig6o); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2a:15-51 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 2o6d (1964). This comment will not deal
with the topic of pre-emption but with judicial prohibition of picketing in light of
the constitutional protection of free speech.
OIn a number of decisions concerning an employer's property rights, the
Supreme Court has upheld the right of labor to conduct organizational practices.
NLR.B v. Babcock & Wilcox., 351 U.S. 1o5 (1956); NLRB v. LeTourneau Co., 324
U.S. 793 (1945)- Similarly the National Labor Relations Board has held that union
activities can be conducted upon company owned streets. See General Dynamics/
Telecommunications, 137 N.L.R.B. 1725 (1962); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 72
N.L:R.B. 132 (1947); Brown Shipbuilding Co., 66 NL.R.B. 1047 (1946); United

Aircraft Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 594 (1946). Despite the inferences that may be drawn
from these decisions, none should be unequivocally applied to the problem discussed herein. In these decisions the Court or the Board was concerned with labormanagement problems on the property of management. Picketing on quasi-public
property involves two aspects not dealt with in these cases: (1) private property
which is opened and used by the general public; and (2) the right of an owner,
a distinterested party to the labor dispute, to prohibit trespassing upon his premises.
"425 Pa. 382, 227 A.2d 874 (1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3167 (U.S. October
24, 1967) (No. 478).
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conduct of the pickets--whether the picketing constituted an invasion
of the private property of Weis and/or Logan-and the purpose for
which the picketing was employed.
The court determined that the shopping center was open not to
the general public but only to those members of the public who
could possibly contribute to the financial success of the venture. Therefore, the shopping center retained its private property character. The
invitation to the public was limited to those who might benefit Weis'
and Logan's enterprises, including potential customers as well as
employees of the shopping center businesses. Since the pickets were not
within this class of persons"3 the picketing, although peaceful, constituted a trespass which was properly restrained. By determining that
the conduct of the pickets constituted an unlawful invasion of property, it was unnecessary to consider whether the picketing was for an
2
unlawful purpose.'
In Thornhill v. Alabama'3 the Supreme Court held that the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute through
picketing must be afforded the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech.' 4 Although Thornhill applied broad constitutional protection to picketing, it remained to be decided whether the protection
extends to non-employees and whether the nature of the property
upon which the picketing is conducted affects the exercise of the right.
In AFL v. Swing15 the Thornhill doctrine was extended to cover
situations where pickets were not employees of the picketed establishment. In this instance the pickets were members of a union which
had made an unsuccessful attempt to organize Swing's employees. The
union picketing was enjoined under a state statute which prohibited
peaceful picketing when conducted by non-employees. In applying
Thornhill, the Court held that the lack of an employer-employee relationship could not preclude protection of picketing as a right of free
speech guaranteed under the Constitution. 6 Thornhill and Swing
established picketing as a right enjoying constitutional protection
"Accord, Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964) (invitation to
patronize not an invitation to entice customers away).
'"227 A.2d at 878.
331o U.S. 88 (1940); accord, Carlson v. California, 3io U.S. io6 (1940).
"310 U.S. at 1o2.
'5312 U.S. 321 (1941).
"'Id. at 326. The Court's opinion does not clearly indicate where the picketing
occurred. However, the state court's opinion states that Swing was the proprietor
of a beauty parlor in Chicago and that the picketing was conducted on the street
in front of Swing's shop. Therefore, it appears that union activity occurred on
public property and not on quasi-public property. See Swing v. AFL, 372 Ill. 91,
22 .N.E.2d 857 (1939).
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against arbitrary and indiscriminate prohibitions. 17 However, the inevitable collision between the right to picket and an owner's property
rights, where that picketing is conducted upon quasi-public property,
8
had not yet confronted the Court.'
9
In Marsh v. Alabama' a member of Jehovah's Witnesses used a
sidewalk located within the shopping district of a company-owned
town 20 for the distribution of religious literature. The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether a state could, within the first and fourteenth amendments, impose criminal punishment under a trespass
statute for the distribution of literature against the express wishes of
the town's management. The Court held that since the facilities were
operated primarily for the benefit of the general public, and since their
operation was essentially a public function, a state could not impose
penal sanctions upon individuals exercising their constitutionally protected rights. The Court, therefore, recognized that the right of free
speech occupied a preferred position with respect to the rights of a
property owner. 2 ' The Court stated:
"See Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos,
k Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769

320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery
(1942) (concurring opinion).

But the Supreme Court has not hesitated to uphold state restraints of conduct
which are an abuse of the right to picket rather than a means of peaceful and
truthful publicity. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing
for economic coercion rather than for publicity); Local io, Journeymen v. Graham,
345 U.S. 192 (1953) (picketing in direct confrontation of State's right to work
law); Building Service Employees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (picketing employed to coerce employer to force union membership); Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (picketing to secure compliance with demand that
employees be hired in percentage to the racial origin of its customers); Teamsters
Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (picketing to impose unions' interest upon
small business outweighed by public's interest that small business be free from
dictation of business policy); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949) (picketing for coercing employer to violate antitrust law); Carpenter Local
213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (picketing a cafe having no business
connection with area where industrial dispute centered); -Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (picketing found to
be enmeshed in a background of violence).
"'The argument that an adjoining land owner owns the fee to the center of
the street and that picketing on such land constitutes a trespass has been rejected.
Robinson v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 782, 35 Idaho 418, 207 P. 132
(1922); Vonderschmitt v. McGuire, ioo Ind. App. 632, 195 N.E. 585 (1935).
29326 U.S. 5o (1946).
-2The Supreme Court noted that the town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama known
as Chickasaw, was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, and except for
that possessed all the characteristics of any other American town. In addition, the
town and its shopping district were accessible to and freely used by the general
public and notably lacked any characteristics that would separate the company
owned shopping district from that of any town or city. 326 U.S. at 502-03.
"Id. at 5og. Cf. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
297 N. Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948).
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Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it.22
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, interpreted the
23
issues presented in Marsh as being independent of property rights.
It was his conviction that while the law of an individual state would
control property relations it could not control civil liberties. Although
the company-owned town would be subject to the property laws of
Alabama, the application of such laws could not preclude the exercise
of guaranteed constitutional freedoms.
The Marsh doctrine was applied by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in MarshallField & Company v. NLRB 24 to cover the
rights of non-employees to conduct organizational activities upon privately owned property. Union organizers entered upon a company
owned court-way which bisected the main store at street level and was
used to a limited extent as an entrance by both employees and the
general public. Above the street level the two portions of the main
building were joined. The court held that while the department store
possessed the right to exclude non-employees from conducting their
activity in private employee cafeterias, 25 it could not prohibit constitutionally protected activities on a private court-way, which by its very
26
nature had assumed the appearance of a city street.
The principles announced in Thornhill and Marsh, and applied in
MarshallField, have not been combined and applied by the Supreme
Court of the United States in determining the right to picket upon
quasi-public property.2 7 However, state courts, not precluded by either
federal or state pre-emption, 28 have not hesitated to apply these princi2326
2326

US. at 506; accord, Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 US. 267 (1963).
US-. at 51O-il.

22oo F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953).
mAccord, NLR.B v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 1O5 (1956). The Court
held that an employer may post his property against non-employee union activities
where (i) adequate means of communication were available to the union in reaching employees and (2) where the employer does not discriminate against one union.
Here, the employees could be adequately reached while entering and leaving
the department store.
m2oo F.2d at 380.
"See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
Federal pre-emption prevented the court from passing upon the question whether
a state court could enjoin picketing under the theory of trespass.
'Federal pre-emption has in some instances precluded state court action to
enjoin picketers on quasi-public property. See Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207,
58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 8o 3 (1961). See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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29
ples in protecting the right to picket upon such property.
In State v. Williams3 o union members engaged in peaceful picketing upon walkways which surrounded a drugstore located within a
shopping center. The owner of the shopping center had specifically
posted his property against peddlers, solicitors, and picketers. Despite
this protection, the court reversed a conviction based upon trespass,
holding that when private property is open to the public the owner's
property rights must yield to the interest of free speech. The court
specifically referred to the transformation from private property to
quasi-public property.

[B]ecause the private property... has been opened to the public it has taken on the nature of a quasi-public place. By opening it to the public, the owner's property rights have become secondary to broad use by the public which includes the right of
a labor union to engage in peaceful picketing. The fact that the
property is posted makes no difference at all. 3 '
Relying on the principles of Thornhill and of Marsh the court concluded that picketing upon quasi-public property could not be prohibited as a trespass.
In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Cen32
ter, Incorporated
a divided court upheld the right of labor to picket
by affirming the issuance of an injunction against the shopping center
interfering with the union activity on the center's property. The court
noted the applicability of the above principles and pointed out that
the change from a single proprietorship to a multiple commercial area
changes the very nature of the operation from purely private to public
or quasi-public. While the single proprietor would be entitled to prevent an unauthorized intrusion upon his private property, the owner of
a multiple commercial complex is divested of such right by the very
nature of the property's physical appearance. The identity of private
property attributed to a single commercial establishment is forfeited
in a large, multipurpose shopping center.83
The Supreme Court of California in Schwartz-Torrance Investment
OSchwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers' Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766,
394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); State v.
Williams, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Baltimore, Md. Crim. Ct. 1959); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d
785 0963); People v. Mazo, 44 L.R.R.M. 288 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1959). But cf. People
v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (s961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
1044 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Baltimore, Md. Crim. Ct. 1959).
31d.

at 2360 (emphasis added).

'370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963).

33d. at 794. But see Spohier v. Cohen, 3 Misc. 2d 248, 149 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup.
Ct. 1953).
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Corporationv. Bakery Workers' Local 3134 recognized the problem as
one of accommodating conflicting interests: the right of property
owners to exclusive use and possession of their land to which the
public has been invited, and the right of a union to communicate its
position through the constitutionally protected right to picket. The
court held that the interest of labor outweighed the interest of the
shopping center owner in vindicating a theoretical trespass. The court
noted that by opening private property for use by all who would patronize it, the owner had made that property a quasi-public area. A
union's right to communicate freely is preserved through constitutional
guarantees, while the right of a shopping center owner "lies within
the shadow cast by property rights worn thin by public usage."35
The dissent in Logan Valley recognized the above principles and
their applicability to the issue before the court and refused to resolve
the issue solely by an analysis limited to the rights associated with
private property. In applying the principles of Marsh, the dissent
pointed out that the rights of an owner of quasi-public property become subrogated to the constitutionally protected rights of those individuals who utilize such property. Since picketing was constitutionally
protected, and since the shopping center was quasi-public in nature,
management could not curtail constitutional liberties. The right of
non-employees to picket, as announced in Swing, afforded the pickets
constitutional protection and, therefore, an injunction based upon
trespass was error.
In accordance with the principles of Thornhill, Swing, Marsh and
Marshall Field, a shopping center open to that part of the public
which benefits it economically should not be closed to that part of
the public seeking to disseminate an adverse message concerning the
facts of a labor controversy. The shopping center takes the community
in its entirety or not at all. The theory of trespass, which shopping
center owners have relied on in seeking to enjoin picketing, should
not be a basis upon which to restrain labor from disseminating to the
public their grievances with management. As pointed out by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter: "[T]he technical distinctions on which a finding
of 'trespass' so often depends are too tenuous 'to control decision regarding the scope of the vital liberties guaranteed by the Constitution."30
Although recognizing -the rights of an owner of private property, the
161 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 38o U.S:
906 (1965).
3394 P.2d at 926.
mMarsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 511 (1946) (concurring opinion).

